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A serious battle was conducted on the home front in Australia during World War I. 
The home front was the boundary where trenches were dug against disloyalty and 
sedition, against those within who challenged the mainstream culture. One aspect of 
this battle was the increased monitoring of groups and individuals. This saw the 
passing of new legislation to empower the often disparate military and intelligence 
organizations. In several places a sharp juxtapositioning of the dominant conservative 
culture against marginalized ‘radical’ cultures occurred. 
There were several challenges to the dominant culture; the story of the Russians in 
Brisbane being one amongst many based on political causes. The formation and 
growth of an official club, the Russian Workers Association, gave these alienated 
working migrants an association and a voice. With time, this voice began to represent 
a very specific identity for Russians in Brisbane, and indeed wider Australia.  
This paper looks at the characterization of the Association and its members in selected 
intelligence documents. Taking an historical approach, I argue that a clash between 
the “language of bureaucracy” and the “language of revolution” pervaded the official 
treatment of the Russian Workers Association. Conclusions drawn from these 
documents confirm that the conservative intelligence culture overestimated the 
‘threat’ posed by the Russians 
 
A serious battle was conducted on the home front in Australia during World War I. 
The home front was the boundary where trenches were dug against disloyalty and 
sedition. One aspect of this battle was the increased monitoring of groups and 
individuals through coordinated Federal censorship. By examining the groups targeted 
by this process we can gain some insight into the deep histories of surveillance in 
Australian society. One group that skyrocketed into the public gaze through the Red 
Flag Riots of 1919 and gained infamy in censorship reports was the Russian Workers 
Association (RWA) in Brisbane.3 
 
Many scholars have explored the home front battle in Queensland and the escalating 
conservative response to the threat of sedition. The RWA is examined by Raymond 
Evans4 in several key works that illuminate the social and political turmoil in 
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Queensland. Work by Boris Christa,5 Thomas Poole and Eric Fried6 bring to life the 
forgotten events of Russian activism in Australia. More recently, Elena Govor7 
includes analysis of Brisbane radicals in Australia in the Russian Mirror and Russian 
Anzacs. Kevin Windle8 links Australian radicals with the Soviet Union through his 
examination of the career of ‘sailor, journalist and revolutionary’ Aleksandr Zuzenko. 
 
This paper explores key trends in World War I censorship documents on the Russian 
Workers Association. A mismatch comes to light between the threat posed by the 
RWA and the assessment of any such threat by the intelligence complex. Official 
treatment is dismissive of the alternative perspective presented by Russian activists. 
At the height of suspicion, censors demonise radical politics and characterise Russians 
as criminals who are a danger to the community. This perception of the RWA was 
directly linked to the application of new wartime legislation, which implicitly 
perpetuated suspicion of and hostility towards non-British subjects.9 This paper argues 
that coordinated Federal censorship largely misunderstood and hence overestimated 
the RWA.10 
 
Russians on the edge of the world 
Prior to World War I, Australia—like Britain—was sympathetic to political and 
religious exiles from the so-called last bastion of autocracy in Europe, particularly so 
after the abortive revolution of 1905. Settlers, exiles and escaped prisoners travelled 
via Siberia, journeying often with great difficulty over the border to Pacific ports. 
Japanese steamers provided passage to Asia and finally Australia, rumoured to have 
favourably lax entry controls.11 To give an indication of numbers, Evans cites 2,000 
refugees entering Queensland between 1911 and 1914, joining the 800 Russians 
already present in the 1911 census. By 1918 the Queensland Russian community had 
approximately 4,000 of Australia’s 6,000 Russian residents.12 The majority of these 
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lived in Brisbane and exerted the strongest Russian influence in any city during this 
time. 
 
The personalities and development of the RWA deserve detailed attention themselves, 
yet this is beyond the scope of this paper. Eric Fried has completed extensive work 
into the backgrounds and affiliations of Russians in Brisbane before and during the 
war.13 Not all Russians were political exiles or even activists; however, a very specific 
group of radical exiles operated through Brisbane. These Russians had a wide range 
of sometimes conflicting political affiliations and many had participated—some in 
commanding roles—in uprisings and subversive activities in Russia leading to trial 
and imprisonment. It was their influence that became increasingly dominant in the 
local Russian Club, formed in January 1911. Originally a moderate organization 
aiming to support newly arrived compatriots, its leadership had changed by December 
that year and F.A. Sergeyev (the experienced career Bolshevik, Artem) directed the 
future of the Association. In 1912, the name had been changed to the Union of 
Russian Emigrants and an even more class-orientated title adopted in 1915, Union of 
Russian Workers. This same Association—albeit under several different leaders 
(namely Nikolai Lagutin, Peter Simonoff and Aleksandr Zuzenko)—participated in 
the Red Flag March in 1919 and declared itself to be a Soviet in August of that year. 
The Russian Workers Association soon attracted the attentions of the Queensland 
Police through its members’ political speeches at Domain meetings and interaction 
with other socialist organisations. The RWA also published a series of strongly 
political newspapers.14 Of particular relevance to the censorship process was the 
stream of letters in and out of the RWA’s PO Box 10, South Brisbane. Censored 
correspondence reveals that Russians interested in the RWA were in every state in the 
Commonwealth. To some concerned intelligence agents, this amounted to a 
coordinated national network of malcontents needing to be closely monitored. 
 
The behaviour of Russians with political ties in Brisbane was similar to that of Old 
World immigrants in the New World elsewhere. In his study of the Red Scare, Robert 
Murray points to the formation ‘autonomous groups of proletarian immigrants 
speaking the same language and having the same ethnic background’ operating within 
socialist groups in the United States.15 Recently arrived immigrants tended to translate 
economics, politics, class and law in terms of a European setting. Sally Miller notes 
that politically conscious immigrants from the Old World brought with them a ‘much 
more pronounced class spirit characteristic of professional revolutionaries than had 
been present before’.16 Their perceptions had been shaped by the oppressive 
classroom of their homelands. The situation of the radical immigrant in Australia is 
different from the American case in terms of sheer numbers, though not necessarily in 
revolutionary fervour. 
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The dominance of Bolsheviks in the Association confirmed long-standing suspicions 
about the immigrants. In 1912–13, for instance, concerns were raised about Asiatic 
Russians, especially those without passports. The Queensland police indicated that 
‘about 75% of those alleged immigrants are of the criminal class’.17 Despite 
intelligence that ‘several Russian agitators, who were accustomed to the revolutionary 
methods carried on in Russia, were found to be advocating similar drastic measures 
here’ during the critical 1912 General Strike,18 an early precedent was set regarding 
the fledgling RWA: ‘it entirely consists of the criminal class’.19 This erroneous 
assessment by the Queensland police criminalised those who participated in political 
activism. Correspondence flowed between the State and Federal agencies; for 
Queensland, ‘the main thing [wa]s to shut them out’.20 Unfortunately for state 
officials, the Prime Minister’s office felt that ‘the non-possession [of a passport] may 
indicate nothing more than that the person was a political offender, who under the 
different conditions of Australian life might prove a desirable immigrant’.21 It was 
only a matter of time, however, before official suspicions were transformed into 
expressions of a formal intelligence gathering machine ‘securing the public safety and 
the defence of the Commonwealth’.22 The catalyst for this shift was the advent of the 
Great War. 
 
Defence of the Commonwealth 
In 1914 Parliament prepared Australia to defend the British Empire, surrendering 
once more to the pull of imperial allegiance. This time, however, the fight was in 
Europe and not some far-flung colonial outpost. This burden was not lost in three key 
pieces of wartime legislation that set up the parameters for the experiences of Russian 
activists, indeed any individual or group who challenged the loyalty of the home front. 
The War Precautions Act, and later the Unlawful Associations and Aliens 
Registration Acts, were highly significant in empowering the web of federal agencies 
that monitored and controlled opposition. This legislation changed the official 
treatment of foreigners—potential British enemies—in Australia. Once Australia 
might have been seen as an outpost where it was possible for foreigners (preferably 
white, healthy and able to work) to be assimilated. Now alien citizens were subject to 
an intense, coordinated exercise in surveillance. 
 
Among other things, the War Precautions Act comprehensively targeted the 
movements and communications of aliens. The regulations aimed to counter enemy 
sabotage of the war effort by silencing unofficial interpretations of Australia’s 
participation. The detention of any person in military custody was permitted if ‘such 
detention is desirable for securing the public safety and the defence of the 
Commonwealth’,23 and in the coming years many Russians were detained under this 
Act. The circumstances of their incarceration added to their perception of being held 
in a capitalist cage. A lack of understanding of the experiences and aims of the 
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Russians further compounded their treatment by officers who increasingly saw 
Russian activism only in the context of protecting home front integrity, rather than as 
part of an international movement. The majority of officers did not appear to 
recognise that Russian activism was primarily directed towards changes in Russia and 
that most RWA members considered their return to their homeland to be imminent. 
Any Australian activism—energetic though it could sometimes be—was a mere 
sideline. 
 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, it is unlikely that alternative understandings, 
challenging the political and economic identity promoted by the government, were 
viewed with any less antagonism than they were at the height of the war. However, 
what is likely is that the war provided the climate in which such understandings were 
observed exclusively in terms of their opposition to the policy of all hands on deck for 
Britain. Home front cohesiveness necessitated the internment, surveillance and 
censorship of enemies as a war precaution. One’s German heritage, talk of Irish 
independence, or subscription to radical journals were no longer elements of 
individual personhood; they were explicit expressions of group sedition, corroding the 
edges of the home front. Australia’s British identity was reinforced as those of enemy 
(that is, conspicuously foreign) origin, regardless of their convictions or immigration 
status, were deemed disloyal and dangerous. What changed as a result of the war 
conditions is that the mere physical presence of others became threatening in itself to 
the conservative mainstream. Mirroring developments in Europe and the United 
States, debate and political activism were now fast becoming socially and legally 
intolerable. 
 
Monitoring the disloyal and the disaffected 
Invisible ink! Propaganda against England and the Allies! Even bloody warfare! 24 
Wartime legislation buttressed the state by deepening scrutiny of the population. It 
implicitly continued the authorities’ hostility towards, and often misunderstanding of, 
opposition groups. Regional offices reported on local affairs to Headquarters in 
Melbourne, which briefed London; in turn, international information would be 
forwarded by London. In this way Brisbane could perceive the identity and 
propaganda of its little RWA in the light of wider developments, for example, the 
activities of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the United States and 
union radicalism in the United Kingdom and Canada. Thus it was as part of a global 
intelligence network that Queensland was dealing with the burgeoning political sub-
culture of its Russian community. 
 
A key instrument of that network was the weekly Intelligence Reports on Enemy 
Trading and Other Suspicious Actions.25 Censorship asserted bureaucratic control 
over history being made. It simultaneously supported emergent conservatism whilst 
smothering radicalism. Australia had strong colonial roots and an officialdom whose 
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nature it was to be concerned. In the context of the Great War it was a patriotic duty to 
identify, track and isolate all subversive voices. Military intelligence threw its nets 
wide into the community, pulling enemies to be interned as well as conscientious 
objectors although it is quite likely that some revolutionaries operated outside this 
field.26 Elena Govor observes that ‘Australian military authorities had a tendency to 
see Bolshevist propaganda where none existed’.27 Censors’ notes on the Russians in 
Brisbane confirm this statement. It seems clear that on the one hand, surveillance was 
unlikely to find foreign spies, and on the other, it beat up innocuous activities into 
sinister signs. 
 
The turning point for the RWA was the revolution in Russia. For its members the 
revolutionary period was one of momentous historical process, despite conflicting 
stances on desired outcomes. For Australian authorities, however, revolution was 
associated with traumatic social upheavals and bloodletting in British society, and a 
trigger for social anxiety. The fear of sedition was exemplified through the intense 
interest stimulated by news from Russia. Conservatives could not fail to notice that 
‘czars, kings and other kinds of grand dukes ha[d] bolted’.28 The emotional boost 
these events had on political refugees is best summed up by one Russian who stated: 
‘There is no more time to write, we must start to work, for there is no better time than 
the present to see Bolshevism rule the world’.29 
 
However, 1918 and 1919 were not good years for the Russians in Brisbane. Russia 
was no longer viewed as the steamroller of Europe, but rather as a traitor that had 
succumbed to the sickness of revolution. Russians in Australia were seen as key 
collaborators in the perpetuation of this sickness. Queensland censors raised the 
concern that the RWA represented ‘a sort of club room where the malcontents can 
discuss their propaganda’.30 This was indeed the case. However, the censors’ main 
concern was the mere existence of malcontents on Australian shores. That they should 
have the opportunity to indulge in free speech was an outrage. Even worse, other 
aliens (such as Irish IWW-ites) were ‘consorting with Russian undesirables’.31 It was 
feared that ‘the threatened influx to Australia of enemy and other undesirable aliens 
[wa]s already taking shape’.32 No longer a refugee from a repressive system, the 
Russian activist was typed as ‘a pretty kind of mad dog to let loose on the 
community’.33 An active and vocal group of Russian Bolsheviks whipping up Soviet-
mania amongst unemployed and discontented workers and returned soldiers was an 
undesired development. 
                                                 
26 For instance, there is a noticeable silence on prominent Bolshevik Artem. He did not comply with 
orders to register nor did he seek official documents or sponsorship when he returned to Russia after 
the February Revolution in 1917. While he is mentioned in passing in few early Queensland Police 
reports, Australian authorities seemed unaware that he was submitting reports to the Russian 
Prosveshchenie [Enlightenment] during his six years in Brisbane and were not able to analyse his 
identity in the Censors’ Notes when he sent letters back in 1918. See Q2851 and QS12, BP4/2, NAA. 
27 Govor, Russian Anzacs, p 186. 
28 QF2877, BP4/2, NAA. 
29 M. Procharoff, Peeramon, via Cairns to A. Zuzenko, PO Box 10, South Brisbane, 28 November 
1918, QF2558, BP4/2, NAA. 
30 QF4331, BP4/2, NAA. 
31 RE1017, MP95/1, 168/8/14, NAA. 
32 QF4343, BP4/2, NAA. 
33 RE1099, MP95/1, 168/15/20, NAA. 
7 
The persistent and radical examinations of revolutionary Russia emanating from the 
RWA were interpreted as aggressive, militant, dangerous, violent and of a criminal 
nature. Censors emphasised that ‘it is noticeable that rarely is a Russian letter 
scrutinized in which the revolutionary spirit is not aggressively displayed. The 
conclusion to be arrived at is that if there are law abiding Russians in Australia they 
do not write letters’.34 With rising alarm censors reasoned that even for Russians in 
isolated areas such as Broken Hill, ‘the militancy is strong within them and they are 
looking for an excuse to break out. They are always on the side of disorder’.35 At this 
critical point, concern was raised that this sort radicalism was not only threatening 
home front stability, but also the political future and moral health of British Australia. 
 
In an effort to halt the spread of a red peril, Britain prevented the return of exiled 
radicals via territory controlled by the Allied Intervention. Officers here made it clear 
‘that Russians are not going to leave Australia until Bolshevism is smashed’.36 The 
determination of many Russians to return to their homeland was not fully understood. 
It was seen either as undermining British authority or as some form of lunacy. One 
censor labelled it an anxiety to throw oneself ‘into the human cauldron into which the 
Bolsheviks have converted Russia’.37 Indeed, Russians who clamoured for 
information on how to secure passports were labelled ‘belligerent types’.38 But 
agitation over the loss of their choice to return to a now free Russia could be seen as 
the point of consensus amongst often politically divided Russians. Instead of quietly 
accepting their fate, Russians brought their concerns with them into wider labour 
protests against the government. This strategy did not always work to their advantage, 
as evidenced by the conservative wrath unleashed in the events of the Red Flag Riots. 
 
Trouble spots around the country were seen as being ‘well dosed with Bolshevistic 
literature’.39 The analogy of Bolshevism as some sort of degenerative poison, a 
disease, was a timely one that exploited public fear of the influenza epidemic. This 
ties into an older current that constructs White Australia as young, innocent (or 
susceptible) and unsullied, needing to be protected. By linking Bolshevism and 
Russians with criminality, belligerency, poison and mad dogs, the presence of these 
foreigners was constructed as an unsettling force that became too dangerous to be at 
large. 
 
A loud and sharply unsettling voice belonged to that of unrecognised Soviet consul 
Peter Simonoff. A prolific writer and confident speaker, Simonoff’s zeal took on a 
new meaning when he was appointed as Soviet representative in Australia.40 His 
leadership was not overwhelmingly popular with all Russians, nor consistently 
effective. Nevertheless, he was most successful in arousing the ire of the censors and 
the wrath of military authorities: ‘Simonoff has been a danger to the community all 
along’; ‘Everyday this man is at liberty some new and dangerous deed is done against 
the empire’; ‘Is he up to fresh mischief? One can imagine anything while he is 
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loose’.41 Simonoff grew as the arch-rebel at the centre of all propaganda, and his 
attempts to engage in official dialogue on the issue of Russian passports were 
thwarted. He was finally imprisoned in 1919 under the War Precautions Act. 
 
The censors were unable, or unwilling, to distinguish between news of revolutionary 
Russia, support for revolution and the broader ideals of radical politics, and calls for 
revolution in Australia. RWA correspondence predominantly falls into the first two 
categories. Only a small proportion of correspondents ever instructed workers to rise 
up in armed struggle or guerrilla-style sabotage. Techniques employed by the wider 
labour movement, such as strikes, boycotts and street marches, were the advocated 
forms of protest. Even RWA publications were predominantly watching Russia. 
References to confrontation were in response to the threats Russians felt they were 
increasingly facing. In September 1918 Simonoff informed his Melbourne comrades 
that Brisbane was facing ‘a new organisation … composed of returned soldiers and 
hooligans, who threaten openly to smash the Russian Workers Union …but let them 
try it’. The open hostility of the authorities is clear when the censor blithely 
responded: ‘Possibly the returned soldiers who, thank God, are not all hooligans, may 
yet take the law into their own hands’.42 
 
The isolation and trepidation felt by many Russians cannot be ignored. A Russian in 
north Queensland confided that he ‘cannot call life anything but suffocation’.43 They 
were subject to the double-blind of misunderstanding and censorship. It was noted by 
RWA secretary Zuzenko in the months before the Red Flag March that ‘the repression 
is hitting us more and more’.44 Others lamented that ‘one cannot leave and one has no 
money or work’.45 After the Red Flag Riots, the Russians in general were harassed 
and the RWA fragmented. The critical concern of the censors—the development of a 
Soviet—did not eventuate until after the Red Flag Riots and deportations. The official 
shift occurred in August 1919, when under new leadership ‘the alliance … ceased to 
be a cultured enlightened circle for Russians. The future task … revolutionary 
communist propaganda among the English speaking workers’.46 This change could be 
seen as directly linked to the mounting pressure of federal surveillance, rather than to 
a meteoric increase in the desire to spark revolution in Australia. 
 
It is unlikely that Australian authorities were ever inclined to recognise the differences 
within radical politics. Wartime regulations accelerated the lumping together of all 
perspectives as dangerous propaganda and the inclination to see ‘nests of Russians’ all 
over Australia.47 Censors were generally dismissive of the validity of any left-wing 
activism and proclaimed that ‘the word socialist nowadays covers a multitude of 
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sins’.48 This assessment of left-wing radicalism, which became almost universally 
viewed as Bolshevism, was one that drew heavily on the circumstance that it existed 
outside the legal framework for approved home front activity. 
 
Conclusion 
The Russians in Brisbane were clear targets in the loyalist battle for the home front. 
Russians were undesirable and disloyal on the basis of not being British. After the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, Russians also represented the betrayal of the 
Allied cause and the Bolshevik challenge to British institutions. Russians in Brisbane 
were enthusiastic political activists working for change, changes primarily to working 
class conditions as well as for the broader success of socialism. However, it is likely 
that rank and file Russian activism in Brisbane during the war was linked to 
movements in wider labour causes as much as it was to any immediate desire to 
transfer Bolshevism to Australia. Certainly the core leadership of the RWA were 
Bolsheviks, yet it is unclear how many of these desired to propagate the class struggle 
in Australia at this time, as opposed to returning to participate in Russia. What is 
certainly the case is that Russian activists pursued their own political program in the 
face of intense surveillance and suppression. 
 
This article has examined key trends in intelligence gathered on Russians and 
members of the Russian Workers Association in WWI Intelligence Reports. It asserts 
that the intelligence complex misunderstood and generally overestimated any threat 
posed by the RWA during the war. The story revealed through these documents is not 
necessarily one of action and protest on the behalf of the radical groups themselves, 
but rather a story of concern on the side of the authorities. The twists and turns in the 
wider paper trail of the Russian Workers Association present us with a snapshot of the 
treatment of left-wing activists, those who ‘stood against the dominant beliefs and 
policies of their times’.49 Though somewhat peripheral to the story of Australia in 
World War I, home front surveillance assumes a greater importance today. The 
treatment of the disloyal during the Great War is a critical period in a long history of 
government concern, and in some sense the overarching themes connect to 
contemporary surveillance in our society today. 
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